Monetary Policy with State Contingent Interest Rates

What instruments of monetary policy must be used in order to implement a unique equilibrium? This paper revisits the issues addressed by Sargent and Wallace (1975) on the multiplicity of equilibria when policy isconducted with interest rate rules. We show that the appropriate interestrate instruments under uncertainty are state-contingent interest rates, i.e. the nominal returns on state-contingent nominal assets. A policy that pegs state-contingent nominal interest rates, and sets the initial money supply, implements a unique equilibrium. These results hold whether prices are flexible or set in advance.

Monetary Policy with Single Instrument Feedback Rules

We consider a standard cash in advance monetary model with flexible prices or prices set in advance and show that there are interest rate or money supply rules such that equilibria are unique. The existence of these single instrument rules depends on whether the economy has an infinite horizon or an arbitrarily large but finite horizon.

Unique equilibrium with single monetary instrument rules

We consider standard cash-in-advance monetary models and show that there are interest rate or money supply rules such that equilibria are unique. The existence of these single instrument rules depends on whether the economy has an infinite horizon or an arbitrarily large but finite horizon.

The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Is it Relevant for Policy?

We study environments with sticky prices, wages or portfolios where it is feasible and optimal to use monetary policy to replicate the allocation under full flexibility. In these environments the optimal policy does not depend on the scope of the frictions. In this sense, the strength of the monetary transmission mechanism is irrelevant for the conduct of monetary policy. So, asymmetries in the strength of the transmission mechanisms do not impose a cost on a common policy.

On the Relevance of Exchange Rate Regimes for Stabilization Policy

This paper assesses the relevance of the exchange rate regime for stabilization policy. This regime question cannot be dealt with independently of other institutions, in particular how .fiscal policy is designed. We show that once .fiscal policy is taken into account, the exchange rate regime is irrelevant. This is the case independently of the severity of price rigidities, independently of asymmetries across countries in shocks and transmission mechanisms and regardless of the incompleteness of international .financial markets. The only relevant condition is labor mobility. The imobility of labor across countries is a necessary condition for our results.

Short and Long Interest Rate Targets

We show that short and long nominal interest rates are independent monetary policy instruments. The pegging of both helps solving the problem of multiplicity that arises when only short rates are used as the instrument of policy. A peg of the nominal returns on assets of different maturities is equivalent to a peg of state-contingent interest rates. These are the rates that should be targeted in order to implement unique equilibria. At the zero bound, while it is still possible to target state-contingent interest rates, that is no longer equivalent to the target of the term structure.